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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON TAXATION, GROWTH AND CONSUMPTION
by
Yi Ding
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine three distributional issues in
macroeconomics.
First I explore the eﬀects fiscal federalism on economic growth across regions in
China. Using the comprehensive oﬃcial data set of China for 31 regions from 1952
until 1999, I investigate a number of indicators used by the literature to measure
federalism and find robust support for only one such measure: the ratio of local
total revenue to local tax revenue. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach and
exploiting the two-year gap in the implementation of a tax reform across diﬀerent
regions of China, I also identify a positive relationship between fiscal federalism and
regional economic growth.
The second paper hypothesizes that an inequitable distribution of income nega-
tively aﬀects the rule of law in resource-rich economies and provides robust evidence
in support of this hypothesis. By investigating a data set that contains 193 coun-
tries and using econometric methodologies such as the fixed eﬀects estimator and the
generalized method of moments estimator, I find that resource-abundance improves
the quality of institutions, as long as income and wealth disparity remains below a
certain threshold. When inequality moves beyond this threshold, the positive eﬀects
of the resource-abundance level on institutions diminish quickly and turn negative
eventually. This paper, thus, provides robust evidence about the endogeneity of
vi
institutions and the role income and wealth inequality plays in the determination of
long-run growth rates.
The third paper sets up a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents to investigate the causal channels which run from a concern for international
status to long-run economic growth. The simulation results show that the initial
distribution of income and wealth play an important role in whether agents gain or
lose from globalization.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECTS OF FEDERALISM ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA
IN 1990S
1.1 Introduction
The eﬀects of fiscal decentralization for economic outcomes have been widely dis-
cussed in theoretical work, suggesting that such decentralization improves the eﬃ-
ciency of the use of resources for two main reasons. First, local governments are
believed to be better informed about local preferences. Second, as decentralization
promotes inter-jurisdictional competition, mobile factors such as capital and labor
are expected to move to those jurisdictions that oﬀer better rates of return through
the provision of local public goods and advantageous tax rates (See Oates (1972),
Tiebout (1956)). However, these channels may not work as expected. Although
local governments may know better about local preferences, certain organizational
settings are still necessary to prevent local governments from eliminating either the
positive or negative market incentives (See Qian & Weingast (1997)). Most im-
portantly, for local politicians to adopt eﬃcient policies in a decentralized setting,
political institutions need to provide the right incentives to ensure the accountability
of local governments. In the absence of such accountability, it is often observed (Rus-
sia is a prominent example in the literature, for instance) that local governments are
captured by special interest groups with the result that decentralization is accompa-
nied by corruption and negative economic outcomes. Thus whether centralization
or decentralization would promote political and economic outcomes fostering better
government quality, economic growth, and eﬃcient provision of public goods re-
mains an empirical question. Existing empirical studies of the question so far have
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remained inconclusive, their results depending on the countries in the sample, the
time frame covered, and the fiscal centralization/decentralization indicators chosen.
In the present paper, I provide a new perspective on the question of fiscal fed-
eralism, focusing on China. The use of Chinese data is especially instructive in this
regard as China, like several other emerging economies, had in the 1980s adopted
an explicit policy of fiscal decentralization (see Taillant (1994), Martinez-Vazquez
& McNab (2003)). That policy had been unchanged until 1992. China has also
maintained an average annual growth rate of 10 percent since 1979. Montinola
et al. (1995) attributes the rapid and steady growth to the adoption of a fiscal sys-
tem characterized as federalism1, Chinese style, which has preserved and promoted
markets and political durability and served as a commitment device to guarantee
the economic gains oﬀered by federalism. Blanchard & Shleifer (2001) suggests that
political centralization was crucial in the success of Chinese federalism in this period.
However, existing empirical studies have not necessarily supported the thesis
that fiscal decentralization has promoted growth in China. For example, Zhang &
Zou (1998) finds a negative and robust eﬀect of fiscal decentralization on the China’s
provincial economic growth from 1986 to 1992, while Lin & Liu (2000) provides ev-
idence of positive and significant eﬀects with “production-based-function regression
analysis” using provincial data from 1970 to 1993. Such contradictory results on
the question of fiscal federalism are not peculiar to China. The literature on the
subject is replete with empirical studies that employ diﬀerent data sets for diﬀerent
countries reporting contradictory results. For instance, Xie et al. (1999) examined
the United States spending data on three levels, and found that the distribution of
current fiscal expenditure is optimum and that further fiscal decentralization might
1In this paper, the term federalism and the term fiscal decentralization are used inter-
changeably, although the former covers more than the latter.
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harm the economy. Thiessen (2000) finds a positive relation between economic
growth and fiscal federalism using a sample that includes western developed coun-
tries, certain middle-income countries, and some developing economies with a large
land size (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab (2003)).
In this paper, I provide new evidence on the eﬀects of fiscal federalism in China
by using a data set that has not been used before in the literature and focus on a
quasi-natural experiment that took place in 1992 to study the eﬀects of a dramatic
tax reform that redefined the fiscal role of the central government vis-a-vis the sub-
national governments. In doing this, I argue that two groups of indicators, which
measure the degree of fiscal decentralization from both the expenditure and the
revenue side, should be adopted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an introduction
to China’s tax reform in 1994 from the perspective of fiscal relations between the
central government and local governments. Section 1.3 starts by describing the
data set used to analyze the eﬀects of the tax reform on China’s economic growth;
section 1.3.2 uses fixed eﬀects models with diﬀerent time frames, while section 1.3.3
takes the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach to test the eﬀects of change in tax policy
on growth. The last section concludes the paper.
1.2 China’s Tax Reform of 1994
The year 1979 was a key period in terms of China’s economic development, when
the country oﬃcially announced the plan for economic reform, known as reform and
opening-up. Fiscal relations between the central government and the local (i.e., sub-
national) governments evolved in two distinct stages since then (see Dabla-Norris
(2005)): decentralized revenue in the 1980s and centralized revenue in the mid-1990s.
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1.2.1 The Fiscal System from 1979 to 1993: Baogan System
In the 1980s, China gradually developed a fiscal contract system, under which lower-
level governments negotiated with upper-level governments regarding the budgetary
revenue sharing scheme (Montinola et al. (1995)). Though the details of each
contract remained unclear, these contracts can be classified into two forms:
1. A fixed or adjusted quota scheme was established, under which local govern-
ments remitted to or received from the central government a fixed amount,
subject to upward adjustments.
2. A proportional arrangement was also constructed so that the central govern-
ment and the local governments shared the budgetary revenue in accordance
to a negotiated ratio.
Although there were diﬀerent types of contracts and local governments could choose
among them, the fiscal contract system essentially featured revenue decentralization
because the regulatory authority was mainly moved from the central government to
local governments and directly related the local revenues to the economic perfor-
mance of the latter.
The new system was expected to stimulate the regional economic growth by en-
couraging local governments to “eat from separate kitchens”, aligning the interests
of local governments and enterprises, thus promoting the adoption of eﬃcient lo-
cal economic policies by agencies facing hard budget constraints (Qian & Roland
(1999)). It would also prevent the central government from intervening directly in
the market and serve as an instrument to preserve both positive and negative market
incentives (Qian & Weingast (1997)).
Results of existing empirical studies, however, do not agree as to whether the
expectations were met. Zhang & Zou (1998) finds “a constant and robust higher
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degree of fiscal decentralization of government spending is associated with lower
provincial economic growth” over this period, while Jin et al. (2005) reports results
that contradict Zhang & Zou (1998).
A prominent outcome of the fiscal contract system of the 1980s was the drop in
the share of total revenue received by the central government from 39 percent to
22 percent in 1993 (Dabla-Norris (2005), also see Figure 1.1). As a result the fiscal
deficit was as large as 12.7 percent of total revenue in 1993(Shu-Ki & Yuk-Shing
(1994)). The decrease in the share of revenue received by the central government
was considered to be unsustainable and indicated furthermore that the increase in
the bargaining power of local governments would endanger political centralization
that was crucial for the success of Chinese style federalism (Blanchard & Shleifer
(2001)).
1.2.2 The Fiscal System since 1994: Fen Shui Zhi
The central government decision to undertake tax reform was made in 1989 and
the reform was implemented in the entire country by mid-1993, with nine regions
adopting the new tax system in 1992 and the rest following in 1993. Under the new
tax system, taxes were divided into three categories(Shu-Ki & Yuk-Shing (1994)) 2:
1. Central taxes: Tariﬀs, income taxes on central enterprises, taxes on revenues
from railways, banks and insurance companies, income taxes from financial
institutions obtaining licenses from People’s Bank of China, the central bank,
consumption taxes, oﬀshore oil resource taxes;
2Also see “Finance Vice Minister on Central-Local Tax Assignment”, China Economic
News, Beijing, Vol.XV, NO.1, 3 January, 1994, pp.7-8.
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2. Local taxes: Business taxes (excluding those paid by banks, railways and
insurance companies), income taxes from local enterprises, personal income
taxes; capital gains taxes on land and property sales, estate duties, stamp
duties
3. Shared taxes: Value-added tax, 75% of which is received by central govern-
ment, capital gains taxes on stocks, 50% of which to be received by central
government, resources taxes other than the oﬀshore oil resource tax, most of
which to be received by local governments.
The main goal of this tax assignment system was to raise the central-to-local
tax assignment ratio from 40:60 in 1993 to 60:40 (without a specific time frame for
the attainment of this goal). In order to avoid resistance from local governments,
the central government also decided to carry out this plan gradually and in a “step
by step” manner so that local governments were protected from being deprived of
the tax benefits they so far enjoyed. Specifically, in 1993, the central government
rebated whatever amount was transferred from local governments because of the
tax reform back to them and defined it as the base amount. From then on, the
central government increased the rebate amount by 0.3% every year with each 1%
increase in the sum of two types of tax: consumption tax and value added tax.
With the rebate system, the central government kept the promise that under the
new tax assignment system local governments would receive revenues no less than
those under the old one.
The reform achieved its designated goal as the total revenue collections increased
to over 18% of GDP in 2002 and the central government share of the total budge
revenue increased to around 50% in 2002 (Dabla-Norris (2005)). However, the ex-
penditure scheme did not change much with the tax reform and continued with
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its long-run trend: local governments were responsible for a large portion of total
expenditures, especially in education, culture and health areas3.
The contrast between the revenue sharing scheme and that of expenditures raises
a question central to the empirical studies of fiscal decentralization: the theoretical
literature typically supposes that the ratio of the revenue received by the central
government to the total revenue and the ratio of central government spending to
total spending to move in the same direction as they are assumed to be compatible
measures of fiscal federalism. According to the conventional view, a more decentral-
ized country must present smaller values for both ratios. Following this convention,
China showed both fiscal centralization and fiscal decentralization after the tax re-
form in 1994, because the ratio of revenue received by the central government to
the total went up while the ratio of expenditures by the central to total expen-
ditures went down simultaneously. In what follows I will be concerned about the
implications of these changes in interpreting the eﬀects of the Chinese tax reform of
1994.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
This section presents two ways of analizing the eﬀects of the 1994 tax reform on
the growth of China. Section 1.3.2 adopts a fixed eﬀects model to determine the
sign and the significance of the eﬀects of fiscal reform, controlling for other relevant
economic variables. Section 1.3.3 focuses on regional growth two years before and
after the policy change using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence methodology.
3The diﬀerence between the expenditures of local governments and their budgetary
revenue was compensated by increasing transfers from the central government.
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1.3.1 Data Overview
The regional data I use covers all 31 provinces of mainland China between 1980
and 1999, including data on revenues, expenditures, GDP, population and other
economic variables of interest4. However, a few provinces were dropped from the
sample because of data unavailability. For example, Tibet was dropped in the fixed
eﬀects model in section 1.3.2 because of missing growth rates. Table 1.1 presents
descriptive statistics of the variables used at the provincial level: the number of
observations, the mean, the standard deviation, and the minimum and the maximum
values.
The data set used in section 1.3.2 and section 1.3.3 are both derived from the
data in Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China. As pointed out
earlier, the existing empirical literature obtains contradictory results concerning
the eﬀects of the fiscal decentralization. In an attempt to resolve the question, I
employ a two-pronged strategy to exploit the regional data set from Department of
Comprehensive Statistics (1999). The first strategy takes the form of examining the
entire time period from 1980 through 1999 and the second analyzes the two periods
before and after 1994 separately.
4Source: Department of Comprehensive Statistics (1999).
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1.3.2 The Fixed Eﬀects Model Approach: Before and After 1994
Because of the heterogeneity across provinces5, I first adopt the fixed-eﬀects model
to analyze provincial economic performance from 1980 through 1999 and focus on
the average within-unit eﬀects of fiscal reform on regional growth6.
The specific fixed-eﬀects model I employ takes the following form,
∆Yi,t = αi + β0di,t +Xi,tβ1 + ui,t (1.1)
where ∆Yi,t is the GDP growth, di,t represents diﬀerent choices of fiscal decentraliza-
tion indicators, Xi,t is the vector of variables that help explain heterogeneity across
provinces but may be time variant. αi captures fixed eﬀects for each province.
In the empirical analysis, two provinces, including Hainan and Tibet, were
dropped from the data set because GDP growth data were unavailable for them.
Chongqing was a city aﬃliated with the Sichuan province and had not been directly
supervised by the central government until 1997, when it became one of the four
municipalities.8 Thus, both Chongqing and Sichuan were dropped from the data
set.
5See Figure 1.2.
6The estimators for slopes in the fixed eﬀects model might be thought of as the average
within-unit eﬀects of corresponding explanatory variables on the dependent variable. I
have also compared the heterogeneity across provinces with that across time and found
that the latter is trivial7.
8In mainland China, there are three diﬀerent names equivalent to each other in terms
of administrative level: the province, the municipality and the autonomous region. The
counterpart in the U.S. is the state. There are 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4
municipalities in China now.
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The Fixed Eﬀects Model 1980-1999
The first set of regressions focuses on the entire sample and the results are reported
in table 1.2,table 1.3 and table 1.4
The conventional indicators used in the literature were not adopted because, as
mentioned earlier, they move in opposite directions after the tax reform in 1994.
Instead, I take both expenditures and revenues into consideration to better measure
the degree of fiscal decentralization. The first six models reported in the table
diﬀer in terms of the indicators of fiscal decentralization. The qualitative conclusion
is that, as expected, fiscal decentralization is positively correlated with regional
economic growth. These correlations are robust to the inclusion of economic control
variables.
One result worthy of note in table 1.2 is that two indicators, the ratio of local
expenditure to local total revenue and the ratio of local total revenue to local tax
revenue, have significant positive and negative eﬀects respectively. These estimates
remain significant in both table 1.3 and table 1.4. At first sight, it may be surprising
to see that increases in local revenue would slow down economic growth, as suggested
by the signs of these two significant indicators. It is, therefore, important to note
that local revenues in the data come from two sources, namely local tax revenue
and transfers from the central government. These transfers are typically earmarked
for specific uses and do not represent fiscal decentralization. For a given level of
transfers from the central to the local government, increases in local tax revenues
and in local spending, both representing a higher degree of fiscal decentralization,
are positively correlated with economic growth.
Given the significance of these two indicators, I reestimate the model including
additional control variables that may help explain economic growth. These control
variables are education expenditure as a share of GDP, the population growth rate,
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and the degree of openness. The estimated coeﬃcient of degree of openness is
not significant in any regression, while that of education spending is significant (and
negative) only when population growth is excluded. However, as suggested by figures
1.4 and 1.5, these observations may reflect the heterogeneity across provinces lasting
for the entire time horizon, which should be captured by a time-invariant dummy
variable.
The Fixed Eﬀects Model: Before and After 1994
Given the significance of the fiscal indicators in the model using the regional data
set from 1980 to 1999, I next investigate their behavior in the two periods before
and after the fiscal reform in 1994. The estimation results are reported in table 1.5
and table 1.6.
I have four basic conclusions from the regression results,
1. Neither the ratio of local expenditure to local total tax revenue nor the ratio of
local total revenue to local expenditure explains GDP growth well regardless
of the period;
2. The ratio of local expenditure to local total revenue, which is always significant
in the sample 1980 to 1999, becomes insignificant after 1994;
3. Both the ratio of local tax revenue to local total revenue and the ratio of local
tax revenue to local expenditure become significant after 1994, although they
ere not significant in the previous period;
4. The ratio of total local revenue to local tax revenue preserves its sign and
significance, with the estimated absolute value of the coeﬃcient rising signifi-
cantly.
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These results are best explained with recourse to the specifics of the 1994 tax
reform in terms of its eﬀects on the distribution of revenues. Before 1994, most
of local spending was financed by revenues raised by local governments, with the
central government remitting smaller amounts subject to negotiations between in-
dividual local governments and the central government. As the central government
only received a portion of the total (tax) revenue, the transfers from central to
local governments were relatively smaller compared to the post-1994 period. In
other words, the local governments raised taxes, transferred a portion to the central
government and were allowed to exercise discretion in spending the rest. Thus, in-
dicators about local expenditures before 1994 represented the actual degree of fiscal
decentralization more accurately than indicators of local revenue. After 1994, the
central government successfully increased its share of the country’s total tax revenue
from roughly 40% to 60%. At the same time, because extra local spending became
subject to a request and approval process from the central government as discussed
in section 1.2, the indicators on the expenditure side do not accurately reflect the
degree of fiscal decentralization. Furthermore, the revenue side has become a better
indicator of fiscal decentralization as provinces with higher (tax) revenue have been
able to keep an increasing share of their revenues and get higher rebates from the
central government according to the uniform tax distribution scheme adopted after
1994.9
To sum up, the results so far suggest that fiscal decentralization is positively
correlated with regional GDP growth. The multiplicity of the dimensions of fiscal
decentralization do raise some problems with regard to the choice of decentralization
9This solely refers the rebate system adopted with the 1994 tax reform and does not
include the additional transfers from the central government, which are usually earmarked.
12
indicators but, as it showed, a closer look at the institutional structures helps clear
the conceptual diﬃculties.
1.3.3 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis: A Quasi-Natural Experiment
As mentioned in the introduction to the Chinese tax reform of 1994, the reform was
carried out in two stages: the country was divided into two groups, one, denoted as
Group A, implemented the reform in 1992, the other, denoted as Group B, followed
in 1994. This two-stage reform process gives a quasi-natural experiment setup and
provides me with the opportunity to apply diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence techniques, which
require both an treatment and a control group.
Specifically, in 1992, the central government decided to test the new tax as-
signment system initially (Shu-Ki & Yuk-Shing (1994))10 in nine regions, including
Zhejiang Province, Liaoning Province, Xinjiang Autonomous region, Tianjin mu-
nicipality, Shenyang City, Daian City, Qingdao City, Wuhan City, and Chongqing
City. Both Shenyang and Dalian belongs to Liaoning Province, Qingdao belongs to
Shandong Province, Wuhan belongs to Hubei Province and Chongqing was a city
aﬃliated to Sichuan Province until 1997. As the data set is at the province level, I
include Zhejiang, Liaoning, Xinjiang and Tianjin in group A, and moved Shandong,
Hubei, Sichuan and Chongqing to group B. Again, because of data unavailability,
Hainan and Tibet were dropped.
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Estimation Results
The regression equation takes the standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence form,
10Also see “Finance Vice Minister on Central-Local Tax Assignment”, China Economic
News, Beijing, Vol.XV, no.1 (3 January 1994), pp.7-8.
13
∆yi,t = α + β0Zi.t + β1Ti + β2Pi + γTi ∗ Pt + ϵi,t (1.2)
where ∆yi,t represents either the regional GDP growth or the regional per capita
GDP growth rate (I use these two GDP growth rates to test the robustness of the
estimator). The variable Zi.t is a control variable indicating the initial value of either
GDP or per capita GDP. The dummy variable,Ti, is for whether the province is in
the treatment group, i.e. Group A, taking the value of one if the corresponding
province is in the treatment group and zero otherwise. Another dummy variable,
Pi, indicates whether the observation is made after 1991, with the value of one if
the corresponding observations is made after 1991 and zero otherwise. The γ is
the coeﬃcient for the interaction term, the product of Ti and Pt, and captures the
treatment eﬀects, namely the diﬀerence between the change in the treatment group
and that in the control group due to the tax reform. The estimation results are
reported in table 1.7,
Model (26) and model (27) take the provincial total GDP growth as the depen-
dent variable, while models (28) and (29) take the provincial per capita GDP as the
dependent variable. It is only in the model (28) that the interaction term shows a
significant coeﬃcient at 10% significant level , while the other three regressions do
not present significant results for the coeﬃcient of the interaction term. Thus, the
results here suggest that the tax reform is associated with “less developed” provinces
growing at even slower rates, with model (28) being used to test the treatment eﬀects
in the lower 75% per GDP growth group.
Given what I found in the section 1.3.2, where the fixed eﬀects models showed
changes in the significance of diﬀerent fiscal decentralization indicators with diﬀerent
time periods, I can interpret the results in table 1.7 in the following way. As
I discussed earlier on page 10, given the central government promise that local
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governments do not experience reductions in their revenues (a promise backed up
by increases in transfers to local governments) richer provinces tend to get larger
transfers from the central government. Within the short time period of 2 years after
the tax reform, those relatively poor provinces with lower growth rates faced the
situation where they had to remit the same percentage of revenue as others but
received smaller transfers compared to the richer provinces, thus, had their growth
rates slow further down.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence setting adopted here has certain shortcomings be-
cause of data limitations that need to be identified.
1. The eﬀects of the tax reform on regional economic growth may not be picked
up in the data within only two years. A data set covering a longer time horizon
would be more useful in examining the diﬀerences between the treatment group
and the control group. As the control group was subjected to the same reform
relatively quickly after the treatment group, my analysis was limited to a short
time horizon and the results might reflect this.
2. There are only 4 provinces in the treatment group, while there are 21 provinces
in the control group. The small size of the treatment group would bias the
estimators. For example, Donald & Lang (2007a) suggests that if the size of
the group is not large enough, the error term is not homoscedastic.
1.4 Conclusion and Remarks
In this paper, I took China’s 1994 tax reform as an example of a change in the level
of fiscal decentralization and examined its eﬀects on regional economic growth. I
found the conventional fiscal decentralization indicators, including the ratio of local
revenue to the national revenue and the ratio of local expenditure to the national
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expenditure, to be deficient for the purposes as they are not consistent with each
other: one increased while the other decreased for the same country (i.e., China)
during the same period (i.e., 1994-1999). In other words, the multiple dimensions
of fiscal decentralization implied that none of the one-sided indicators works well
as a measure of the degree of fiscal decentralization. I then turned to another set
of indicators incorporating the revenue side and the expenditure side together. To
test their robustness, I applied these indicators to three samples: 1980-1999 period
taken as a whole, 1980-1994 and 1994-1999 periods taken separately. The estimation
results suggest that the significance of any given indicator varies with the time period
for reasons to do with the specifics of the tax reform. Moreover, I did find the ratio
of local total revenue to tax revenue to be robust in all the regressions.
Next I used the incremental nature of the tax reform as a quasi-natural exper-
iment and used a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation procedure. Here, estimation
results are only significant for the “less developed” provinces. It might be a reflec-
tion of the sample selection process associated with the quasi-natural experiment
and the results could be improved if time frame was extended and sample size was
increased. As the nature of the experiment only provides for a two-year window, it
is hard to further improve the estimation results within this specific analysis.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of All Regions of China 1980-1999
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
year N/A N/A N/A 1980 1999
GDP 1309 876.6836 1114.779 81.7 10375.6
Local Revenue 1403 41.18031 65.85449 -1.1021 766.19
Taxes 1302 33.32606 54.96021 .0302 507.13
Industrial & Commercial Taxes 1182 28.26344 50.80506 .0279 497.54
Local Expenditure 1403 45.68509 86.53568 .05 965.9
Capital Construction cost 1314 5.988916 10.42732 .01 143.86
Education,Culture, Sciences and Health 1387 11.46312 22.82099 .03 244.18
Government Administrative 1350 5.023328 8.736905 .08 74.05
Population 1381 2827.861 2049.529 122.8 9387
Imports and Exports 1083 223020 1012428 5.51 14000000
Note:The GDP of 1952 was taken as the base year and all the other years were taken as the
percentage of it. All the numbers of revenue and expenditure are in hundreds of millions
yuan. The population is in tens of thousands.
Table 1.2: Fixed Eﬀects Model with Entire Data Set 1980-1999 (1)
(1) (2) (3)
local total revenue to expenditure -0.007**
(0.003)
local tax revenue to expenditure -0.01*
(0.006)
local total revenue to tax revenue -0.022***
(0.009)
Prob > F 0.018 0.085 0.004
Note: superscripts *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 1.3: Fixed Eﬀects Model with Entire Data Set 1980-1999 (2)
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
local expenditure to total revenue .015*** .009* .010** .010** .012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Edu,Health,Sci & Culture -.632** -.243 -.264
(0.312) (0.314) (0.331)
Population growth -1.965*** -1.904*** -1.948***
(0.345) (0.354) (0.357)
Openness .012 .020
(0.016) (0.015)
Prob > F 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
The expenditure on education, health, science and culture is measured as the percentage of
GDP. The openness is measured by the ratio of total imports and exports to GDP.
Note: superscripts *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 1.4: Fixed Eﬀects Model with Entire Data Set 1980-1999 (3)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
local total revenue to tax revenue -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.0236 *** -0.0217*** -0.020**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Edu,Health,Sci & Culture -0.736** -0.357 -0.343
(0.318) (0.317) (0.331)
Population growth -2.108*** -2.031*** -2.058***
(0.341) (0.347) (0.351)
Openness 0.013 0.024
(0.016) (0.016)
Prob > F 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
Note: superscripts *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 1.5: Fixed Eﬀects Model Before and After 1994 (1)
Before 1994 After 1994
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
local expenditure to total revenue 0.016** 0.026
(0.006) (0.019)
local expenditure to tax revenue 0.014* -0.025*
(0.007) (0.014)
local tax revenue to total revenue 0.019 0.132***
(0.014) (0.037)
Prob > F 0.011 0.0520 0.190 0.170 0.073 0.0005
Note: superscripts *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 1.6: Fixed Eﬀects Model Before and After 1994 (2)
Before 1994 After 1994
(20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
local total revenue to expenditure -0.006 0.007
(0.004) (0.026)
local tax revenue to expenditure -0.007 0.069**
(0.009) (0.031)
local total revenue to tax revenue -0.021** -0.148***
(0.009) (0.031)
Prob > F 0.119 0.384 0.020 0.796 0.030 0.000
Note: superscripts *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 1.7: Regression Results with Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence
(26) (27) (28) (29)
Intercept 0.085*** 0.127** 0.062*** 0.091**
(0.014) (0.043) (0.007) (0.032)
Treatment 0.048 -0.006 0.056** -0.045
(1.10) (0.09) (0.023) (0.050)
Period 0.127 *** 0.172 *** 0.071*** 0.067
(0.020) (0.053) (0.011) (0.040)
Interaction Term When:
Initial position below 75% percentile -0.061 -0.073*
(0.061) (0.040)
Initial position above 75% percentile 0.008 0.041
(0.934) (0.064)
Prob > F 0.000 0.0187 0.000 0.115
Note: superscripts *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Figure 1.1: Local Revenue and Expenditure Share 1979-2010
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Note: The local share of revenue/expenditure is defined as the ratio of local
revenue/expenditure to the total revenue/expenditure,i.e., the summation of local
revenue/expenditure and the central revenue/expenditure
Figure 1.2: GDP Growth Heterogeneity across Provinces in China 1980-1999
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Figure 1.3: GDP Growth Heterogeneity across Years in China 1980-1999
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Figure 1.4: Education Share Heterogeneity Across Provinces 1980-1999
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Figure 1.5: Openness Heterogeneity Across Provinces 1980-1999
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CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMIC ORIGIN OF THE RULE OF LAW
2.1 Introduction
The “Resource Curse” found by Sachs & Warner (1999, 2001) has given rise to an
extensive empirical literature that tries to identify the mechanisms underlying the
puzzle that countries with abundant resources grow slower than those without them.
Leite & Weidmann (1999), Sala-i Martin & Subramanian (2003) and Bulte et al.
(2005) provide evidence that the eﬀects of resource-abundance on economic growth
are marginal after controlling for institutions and price volatility, suggesting that
institutions may be the channel via which resource endowments aﬀect economic
performance. They also find that the “point resources”–those extracted from a
narrow economic or geographic field like oil, mineral or plantation crops (Isham
et al. (2005))–are negatively correlated with the quality of institutions. Better
institutions, as part of social infrastructure, that provides the background against
which agents in an economy interact, accumulate capital, and produce output (Hall
& Jones (1999)), on the other hand, are found to promote economic growth.
The existing literature takes institutions as predetermined and suggests that
the eﬀects of resource-abundance largely depends on whether the institutions are
“grabber-friendly” or “producer-friendly”, i.e., whether resource rents are distributed
in favor of rent-seeking activities or production activities (Mehlum et al. (2006)).
However, it is easy to see that here a potential endogeneity problem may arise as
the precise mechanisms that connects resource-abundance to institutions are still
not clear. For example, depending on the level of income inequality, the institution
the literature calls the rule of law can be either positively or negatively aﬀected by
the discovery of new resources.
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To the extent that property rights are not perfectly and clearly assigned to
economic agents, there is an incentive to encroach on the property of others through
a variety of means, including legal and extra-legal ones. The more equal a society
is in terms of the distribution of its resources, the more level is the playing field
in which the contest for additional resources is played out. Consequently, with
a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, the incentive to encroach on
others property is diminished. As a result, in such societies agents would have
stronger incentives to obey the rule of law. As inequality increases, however, the
incentives for engaging in a contest to grab the property of others get stronger, with
the consequence that the rule of law is less likely to be obeyed and observed. On
the other hand, in a society with an unequal distribution of resources, those agents
that possess more face increased competition for these resources and, thus, have
both an incentive and the means to institutionalize the rule of law. It is, therefore,
an empirical question as to whether income and wealth inequality is correlated
positively or negatively with the rule of law.
In light of such a conceptual framework, I, therefore, aim to examine whether or
not resource-abundance level aﬀects the quality of one specific dimension of insti-
tutions, the rule of law as it interacts with income distribution. To the best of my
knowledge, the present paper is the first paper that systematically examines this
relationship. The same methodology can be easily extended to other dimensions of
institutions like democracy or political stability.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the
data set I use in this chapter. Section 2.3 adopts two distinct estimation method-
ologies and presents the results. Section 2.4 concludes the paper.
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2.2 Data
Because both institutional variables and resource indicators change very slowly over
time, it is important to understand statistic methodologies that are used to get the
data set. Those methodologies also aﬀect my model selection. I reviewed the critical
variables that were adopted in the empirical analysis.
2.2.1 The Standardized Income Gini
The data set for the income Gini comes from the Standardized World Income In-
equality Database (SWIID), which “provides comparable Gini indices of gross and
net income inequality for 153 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to
the present along with estimates of uncertainty in these statistics.”1 There are two
popular sources for the income Gini: the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the
World Income Inequality Database (UNU/WIDER-UNDP, 2000), known as WIID2.
However, neither of them is suitable for my worldwide cross-national study. There
are two reasons for the lack of of suitability. First, the LIS data set suﬀers from
having a limited number of observations despite having good comparability for cross-
national studies3. Second, the WIID does not have a consistent variable for income
inequality for all countries in its wide coverage4 because its observations diﬀer in the
definitions of income measured, reference units, population covered and/or sources.
1Solt, Frederick. 2009. Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. Social
Science Quarterly 90(2):231-242. SWIID Version 3.1, December 2011.
2WIID was considered as an update and extension to the data set generated by
Deininger and Squire (1996). It assembles more sources and documents them in detail to
provide the possibility of generating comparable variables across countries and periods.
3LIS only covers up to 36 countries and areas, most of which are among the advanced
developed economies, see http://www.lisdatacenter.org/pretechdoc.htm.
4Its current version 2.0C covers 5313 observations.
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Although there have been some attempts to improve comparability within the WIID,
like Babones & Rivadulla (2007), their methods rely on adjusting the “secondary
data set” (Atkinson & Brandolini (2001)) by either adding or subtracting constant
terms, which may either underestimate or overestimate the real value.
The SWIID constructs the income Gini index across countries and over time in
a diﬀerent way, aiming at maximizing comparability with widest coverage. First,
it incorporates both the WIID and the LIS, eliminates the observations that cover
only a portion of the population and discards the observations before 1960.5 As a
result, the new compiled data set covers twenty one categories of income inequality
measurements by combining various definitions of income and diﬀerent reference
units. For each country, each year may have up to twenty one observations, where
zero means that no observation for any category for that year and twenty one means
that the data are available for all the categories. Next, the conversion factor, ρabit,6
is addressed, i.e., the ratio is directly calculated when the data are available, while
it is predicted with models when the data are not available. Then the ρ1bit, which
refers to the ratio of Gini index in LIS net-income data to that in category b, is
calculated as the product of ρabit and ρ1ait. After all ρabit and ρ1ait are calculated,
twenty series of ρ1bit can be obtained and all of them are comparable to LIS net-
income data. In other words, there are 20 observations for country i in year t in
theory, although almost all the series are incomplete. The next step picks up either
one of the observations or their average as the realization of the inequality index
5The SWIID does not take into consideration the observations for certain groups of
people such as urban population, rural residents and so on, because they may not repre-
sent the whole country. There are two exceptions, the data for Argentina and Uruguay
only covers urban residents as they both exhibit high rate of urbanization 90% and no
observation for the whole population of either country is available.
6It is defined as the ratio of Gini index in category a to that in category b for country
i in year t.
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for country i in year t, depending on which has the smaller standard error. The
final step uses a five-year weighted moving average algorithm to smooth the data.7
At the same time, Monte Carlo simulation is adopted to get a point estimate of
LIS-comparable net-income inequality and the corresponding standard errors. The
complete data set is plotted in figure 2.1.
2.2.2 The Rule of Law
The data sets I have for the rule of law variable come from two sources: the World-
wide Governance Indicators (WGI) project and the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG). The former covers more countries with a short time horizon while
the latter covers a longer period but a smaller number of countries. However, they
are highly correlated with each other and are used in the following econometric esti-
mations to crosscheck the robustness of the econometric results, with one exception:
due to the rapid increase in the number of instruments when generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator is applied for the dynamic panel model, WGI is not
applicable because of the limited number of observations contained in it.
The Rule of Law from WGI
The WGI data set, which consists of six indicators regarding the quality of gover-
nance based on a large amount of surveys, was updated every two years from 1996
to 2002 and annually since 2002. One of those six indicators is “Rule of Law”, “cap-
turing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
7The moving average equation is Gi,t = 1/6×(Gi,t−2+Gi,t−1+2∗Gi,t+Gi,t+1+Gi,t+2).
There are two exceptions: the observations from LIS are not adjusted thanks to its high
quality; the observations for eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are not adjusted for the
years from 1989 to 1992, because the changes of inequality index values are most likely
caused by the social reforms then taking place instead of measurement error.
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the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.
(Kaufmann et al. (2010)) I used the version released in 2012 in this paper, which
covers 215 economies and up to 2011.8 The value of the rule of law variable ranges
from -2.67 (weak) to 2 (strong) and most of them are between −2 and 1.5.9
The Rule of Law from ICRG
The rule of law from the ICRG data set is one of the twelve indicators for the sub-
category “political risk”. It consists of two sub-components, namely the “Law” sub-
component and the “Order” sub-component.10 The former measures “the strength
and impartiality of the legal system” and the latter is “an assessment of popular
observance of the law”.11 Each sub-component is between 0 points (worse) and 3
points (better), thus, the rule of law from ICRG comprises zero to six points. I used
the version published at the end of 2010 with 3464 annual observations covering 146
countries from 1984 until 2010. 12
8After merging all the data together, I deleted non-independent economies and non-
existing countries as of 2010. I also deleted the observations for 2011 since I focus on the
period spanning 1970-2010.
92079 out of 2300 observations fall in the interval.
10In the ICRG data set, the name of this variable is “Law and Order”.
11See http://www.prsgroup.com/.
12Similar to the way of dealing with WGI data, I deleted the non-independent
economies, non-existing countries as of 2010. I also deleted the observations for 2011
since I am focusing the period spanning 1970-2010.
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Correlations between ICRG and WGI
There are two ways of looking at these numbers as either cardinal or ordinal. They
are cardinal numbers because they directly tell the strength of the rule of law for
each country in a year; alternatively, they are ordinal numbers since those with lower
values in either system have worse rule of law than those with higher values.
To demonstrate the high correlation between these two data sets despite diﬀer-
ences in coverage, I first examine the correlation coeﬃcients between the rule of law
from WGI and that from ICRG as a whole as well as for each year as shown in
table 2.1, where high correlations are present for all the years available in both data
sets.
Secondly, I consider the characteristics of these observations as ordinal numbers.
While it is diﬃcult to summarize the information when all the observations from
both data sets are displayed in one picture, I calculate the mean for the rule of law
for each country, using the data from both sources, and then mark these means in
figure 2.2 to examine the relative position of each country in both data sets. The
visualized statistical results indeed show that the country with a smaller value in
one data set also ranks lower in the other.
In conclusion, the high statistical correlation and observed similarity between
these two data sets suggest that both measurements for rule of law are plausible.
2.2.3 Measuring the Education Inequality
I also introduced the education Gini index as a potential instrument for income
inequality.13 My basic source of data on education inequality is the well-known
13Education inequality is highly correlated with economic inequality, see recent work
Rodr´ıguez-Pose & Tselios (2009), Rodr´ıguez-Pose & Tselios (2010) and Gregorio & Lee
(2002).
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Barro-Lee Data set,14 which is constructed at 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010. In
the present paper, these were interpolated into annual series to match the frequency
of the other data sources.
I followed the methods introduced in Castello´ & Dome´nech (2002) to calculate
the value of the education Gini. These methods yield the education Gini index value
for a country in a given year as:
EduGini =
1
2H
i=3∑
i=0
j=3∑
j=0
|xˆi − xˆj|ninj (2.1)
where H is the average schooling years of the population aged 15 and over, ni and
nj are share of the population with a certain level education, and xˆi and xˆj are the
total average schooling years required for attaining each education level. i, j can be
any number from 0 to 3, representing no schooling, primary schooling, secondary
schooling and tertiary schooling. Furthermore, equation 2.1 can be expanded as
follows:
EduGini = n0 +
n1x2(n2 + n3) + n3x3(n1 + n2)
n1x1 + n2(x1 + x2) + n3(x1 + x2 + x3)
(2.2)
where xi(i = 0, 1, 2, 3) is the number of average years for each individual education
level.
2.2.4 The Resources Indicators
My resource measure is based on the World Bank’s The Changing Wealth of Na-
tions data set.15 The latest update is published on January 1st, 2010, covering 150
economies. It contains annual estimates of non-renewable resource rent indicators,
14The version used in calculating the education Gini is v. 1.2, was published in Septem-
ber 2011.
15See http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/wealth-of-nations.
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including fuel and non-fuel subsoil wealth16 as well as forest rent. The arable land
from World Development Indicators (WDI) data set was also incorporated into my
analysis. For each individual resource, I use log of natural resources per capita.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
Below I estimate the eﬀects of natural resource abundance on the rule of law condi-
tional on income inequality. I test both static and dynamic models to exploit two
important characteristics of the data set: cross-sectional variation and consistency
overtime. I also average all the variables every three years to address two problems
of the data set: missing values and the observed small magnitude of variation in the
rule of law. Throughout the empirical analysis, I use oil and gold as two diﬀerent
resource indicators, along with two data sets for the rule of law.
2.3.1 The Static Model
The static panel model is as follows,
RLi,t = αi + β1Ginii,t + β2RSi,t + β3Ginii,t ∗RSi,t +ΘXi,t + ϵi,t (2.3)
where RLi,t is the rule of law of country i in period t with each period covering
three-yearly intervals, Ginii,t is the Gini index from SWIID based on net income,
RSi,t refers to natural resources, Xi,t denotes a vector of control variables. This
model seeks to determine the relationship among the rule of law, income inequality
and natural resource-abundance. I also compare three assumptions about αi, which
account for individual eﬀects. These assumptions correspond to three econometric
strategies: pooled OLS, the fixed eﬀects model and the random eﬀects model. The
16The fuel subsoil resources include oil rent, gas rent and coal rent. The non-fuel subsoil
resources include various metals, like lead, gold, etc.
31
eﬀect of resource-abundance on the rule of law is given by β2 + β3Gini, where β2
measures the direct eﬀect of natural resource abundance on the rule of law, an eﬀect
which has been called the “blessing eﬀect.” The interaction term β3Ginii,t ∗RSi,t is
included in the regression to capture the eﬀect of resource abundance on the rule
of law as intermediated by the distribution of income. I cannot expect the sign of
β3 before the regressions, as I hypothesize that higher income inequality to lead to
both predatory contests for abundant resources and an incentive and the means to
institutionalize the rule of law.
The Discussion About The Individual Eﬀects
My data set features two important characteristics that aﬀect the decisions concern-
ing the choice of econometric strategies in the static model. First, it is a short panel
data set, including 193 countries and very limited number of periods. There are five
periods in the WGI data set from 1996-2010, and nine periods in the ICRG data
set from 1984-2010. Second, all variables in the original and the averaged data set
are persistent over these periods for each country. Large variations in institution
quality, resource-abundance, or the Gini index are rare within a country.
To see what is involved here, I plot all the observations of the rule of law from
WGI and ICRG with blue hollow circles in the figure 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Each
maroon diamond sign represents the mean of the rule of law over all years for a given
country. The figures show considerable variation across countries, illustrated by the
vertical gaps between diamond signs. On the other hand, the hollow circles that
surround each diamond sign show persistence of the rule of law within each country
over these periods. These two conclusions are also supported by the figure 2.5
and 2.6, in which the diamond signs depict the means of the rule of law for all the
countries in each period. The variation among countries in each period is shown
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by the spectrum of the values of the rule of law, spanning the entire vertical axis
with no clearly discernible distribution. The persistence within each country is the
only reason that can explain the stability of the diamond signs across all periods.
The other possible explanation, which is unlikely to be valid, is that countries with
a better rule of law drop in rankings by the same amount as the countries with a
worse rule of law rise in each period.
The observations above imply that individual eﬀects exist. I also run the fixed
eﬀects regressions and corresponding F tests to check them. The results are pre-
sented in the table 2.2 and 2.3. All the F tests at the bottom line reject the null
hypothesis that all ui = 0 regardless of the significance level of each coeﬃcient, and
thus confirm the existence of individual eﬀects.17
The next question I need to tackle is that of the choice between the fixed eﬀects
model and the random eﬀects model. It is known that the the properties of the
estimators in the random eﬀects model are not aﬀected by the two characteristics
of my data set mentioned above. However, the estimators of the fixed eﬀects model
would be negatively aﬀected as shown below.
• The estimation procedure of the fixed eﬀects model absorbs the individual
eﬀects into the error term, reducing the possible bias associated with the
problem of omitted variables if those individual eﬀects are correlated with
other regressors. This reduction in bias comes, however, at the cost of eﬃciency
as it removes all cross-sectional variation from the data.(Higgins & Williamson
(1999)) This cost might be very significant since the variation of the variables
are mainly across countries as I showed in the discussion above. To see this
17These F tests suggest that the fixed eﬀects model is better than the pooled OLS
model. Below I will argue that for my purposes the random eﬀects model is more suitable
than the fixed eﬀects model.
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in detail, note that the estimator for the fixed eﬀects model in the form of
the equation 2.3 is the same as the pooled OLS estimator of the following
equation, (Greene (2011))
RLi,t −RLi = β1(Ginii,t −Ginii) + β2(RSi,t −RSi)
+ β3(Ginii,t ∗RSi,t −Gini ∗RSi) +Θ(Xi,t −X i) + (ϵi,t − ϵi)
(2.4)
where the bar above each variable denotes the average over all years of that
variable for each country i. The fixed eﬀects estimator is thus equal to
βFE = [
N∑
i=1
x˜′ix˜i]
−1
N∑
i=1
x˜′iR˜Li (2.5)
where x˜i =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
xi,1,1 − xi,,1 xi,1,2 − xi,,2 · · · xi,1,k − xi,,k
xi,2,1 − xi,,1 xi,2,2 − xi,,2 · · · xi,2,k − xi,,k
...
...
. . .
...
xi,T,1 − xi,,1 xi,T,2 − xi,,2 · · · xi,T,k − xi,,k
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The small variation within each country in my data set would set the above
matrix close to zero and make the estimator unreliable. In an extreme but
possible case, when the time-invariant regressor, xi,k,t, was included, βFE could
not be estimated because the matrix above became 0.
• The βFE in the equation 2.5 is essentially an “average” of the within-group
eﬀects across the countries in the sample. The relatively small number of
years, T , for the observations may lead to within-group eﬀects that are highly
sensitive to the sample drawn and diverge considerably from the true situation.
This divergence may be corrected by increasing the number of countries, N .
But it constitutes a potential problem when the of countries is also small, as
they might all diverge in the same direction.(Clark & Linzer (2012))
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• The correlation between the regressors and the unit fixed eﬀects are high when
it comes to the ICRG data set. Such high correlations can greatly destabilize
the estimates of the eﬀects of the regressors, leading to unreliable inference
(Clark & Linzer (2012)).
The Results
Given the problems associated with the fixed eﬀects model, I use the random eﬀects
model to estimate equation 2.3 for the entire panel data set. Table 2.4 presents the
results. The dependent variable is the rule of law from WGI and ICRG, respectively.
In models 2, 3 and 4, I successively include the democracy indicator and the size
of government, both of which are estimated to have positive impacts on the rule
of law. The last two columns include the secondary schooling attainment rate as
an additional explanatory variable. As mentioned before, the inclusion of the inter-
action term “Gini ∗ Rule of Law” allows me to explore the potentially important
mechanism via which natural resources aﬀect rule of law. As mentioned above, I
hypothesize that abundant natural resources support the rule of law only when in-
come disparity is small enough to reduce the incentives for predatory contests that
may take extra-legal forms.
• The results from WGI data set provide evidence in support of my hypothesis.
The opposite signs of β2 and β3 imply that there is a threshold value of Gini,
beyond which (less equal distribution of income) more abundant natural re-
sources will be associated with a deterioration in the rule of law. In the same
vein if the Gini coeﬃcient falls below this critical value (indicating a more
equal distribution of income) more abundant natural resources are associated
with higher values for the rule of law. Although this “blessing” eﬀect is in-
significant in some model specifications, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term
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β3 is significant across all the specifications except for model 2 where gold is
chosen as the resources indicator.
• The eﬀect of resource-abundance on the rule of law (WGI) as, for example,
implied by model 5 is summarized by
∂(rule of law)
∂(resource abundance) = 0.1118− 0.0038(Gini index) oil as resources indicator
∂(rule of law)
∂(resource abundance) = 0.0835− 0.0024(Gini index) gold as resources indicator
The critical value of the Gini index is 29.42% (0.1118/0.0038) and 34.79%
(0.0835 − 0.0024) for oil and gold, respectively. In my data set, 170 out of
193 countries has a mean Gini index greater than 29.42% and while 138 coun-
tries have Gini indeces greater than 34.79%. This implies that the “blessing
eﬀect” of resource abundance in most countries in my sample is neutralized
by inequalities in their income distributions.
• I also observe that the blessing eﬀects are stronger and diminish faster (as
indicated by the higher intercept and the absolute value of the slope coeﬃcient)
when I use oil as the resources indicator. The diﬀerence between oil and gold
appears to be due to the diﬀerence in their profitability: oil is ranked among
the top five most profitable commodities while gold is not (Barunik et al.
(2013), Narayan et al. (2013)).18. As higher profits from oil raise the returns
to predatory contests for it, the incentives to use extra-legal means in such
contest would be stronger. These results are also consistent with Mehlum
et al. (2006), who also found that the eﬀects of resource abundance are much
18http://cmegroup.com/education/featured-reports/cme-group-leading-products.html.
Also note that both gold and oil have the greatest average trading volume among metals
and energy commodities, respectively.
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stronger but diminish quicker when the resource indicator is changed to the
share of mineral production in GNP from the share of primary exports in
GNP.19
• When I investigate the models using the rule of law data from ICRG, the
coeﬃcients of the interaction terms are not significant for most specifications.
However, the signs of the coeﬃcients remain unchanged from the WGI data
set. Unlike those for the WGI data set though, the constant terms in all ten
regressions for ICRG are relatively high and significant, suggesting that there
remains still some unobservable and significant individual eﬀects. These eﬀects
are even more persistent than that in the rule of law data set from WGI. Those
individual eﬀects may be highly correlated with the explanatory variables, and
thus yield biased estimators due to severe violations of the assumptions of
random eﬀects model. Consequently, I proceed to dynamic-panel estimation
with system GMM estimator to explore the ICRG data set.
2.3.2 The Dynamic Panel Results
The regression equation I use for the dynamic panel estimations utilizes the one-
period (taken to be three years here) lagged value of the rule of law as an explanatory
variable. The specific equation I estimate is
RLi,t = β0RLi,t−1 + β1Ginii,t + β2RSi,t + β3Ginii,t ∗RSi,t +ΘXi,t + αi + ϵi,t (2.6)
There are a number of reasons for adding the lagged value of the rule of law
variable on the right hand side. First, the inclusion of lags is used to account for the
partial adjustment of rule of law over time. Second, the impact of the changes in the
19Minerals have historically been more constestable compared to primary exports.
37
explanatory variables, such as resource-abundance, may not be instantaneous and
their eﬀects may be persistent. Third, “including lags of the dependent variable as
regressors...can also help eliminate serial correlation in the disturbance term“(Wawro
(2002), Beck & Katz (1996)). I also adopt the dynamic panel data (DPD) strategy
to obtain the system GMM estimator (Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988); Arellano & Bond
(1991); Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (2002)). This specific regres-
sion method helps address issues raised by my “small T, large N” panels (Roodman
(2006)). As the WGI data set has only 5 periods and the instruments would quickly
outnumber the groups in the system GMM estimator procedure, I only apply this
methodology to the ICRG data set. For the same reason, I present the results for
the ICRG data set using gold as my resource indicator in table 2.6 for comparison
purposes only as in this case the instruments outnumber the groups even in the
benchmark model.20 The introduction of the dynamic process should not change
the underlying mechanism and here serves solely for the purpose of teasing out the
econometric problems in the static model. Thus, a priori I would expect to obtain
results for the ICRG data set with oil similar to those found before, including the
signs of the coeﬃcients and the critical value of the Gini index.
The results are presented in the table 2.5. Each model used consists of two
regressions: the left column treats all the regressors as endogenous variables and
instruments them with their own 4-period and 5-period lags. The only strictly
exogenous variable is the time variable. The right column is the same as the left
one except for the fact that it includes the Gini index of education as an additional
instrumental variable. Model (4) and model (5) also have slightly more instruments
than those for groups.
20Generally speaking, the number of instruments would increase with the number of
explanatory variables being added, while the number of groups would not vary.
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• Table 2.5 shows that the coeﬃcient of persistence for the rule of law is between
0.56 and 0.72, depending on the model specifications, implying that 56% of
a one-unit improvement in the rule of law today will be carried over to 3
years later. This indicates that previous values of the rule of law variable
yield information about future values, suggesting that my dynamic setup is
valid. I also note that this value is relatively stable across diﬀerent model
specifications and is robust to the inclusion of other variables. The estimated
range is also consistent with the results in Chong & Gradstein (2007), whose
regressions present a range of 0.47-0.73 for the coeﬃcients of persistence of
various institutional indicators after controlling for education and financial
conditions.
• The eﬀects of resource abundance are still positive and robust. The con-
clusions drawn from the random eﬀects model using the WGI data set also
receive additional support. Although absolute values of the coeﬃcients are not
comparable across diﬀerent data sets, the greater magnitudes obtained (e.g.
0.2954 in ICRG v.s. 0.11 in WGI) using the ICRG data set (after teasing
out the persistence factor) also support my initial hypothesis of diminishing
“blessing” eﬀects.
• Diminishing “blessing” eﬀects are also robust across all the model specifica-
tions except for regression 9. One point of interest here is whether the implied
critical value of the Gini index I estimate with the dynamic model is consis-
tent with the results obtained from the static model. To see whether this is
the case, note for example that in regression 10, the critical value is 37.66%
(0.2658/0.007057=37.66) and that the Gini indeces of 117 countries (out of
193 in the sample) exceed this number in my ICRG data set. Further, note
also that this number is lower than what I found in the random eﬀects model
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using the WGI data set with oil resources (170). Yet, it is close to what I
obtained (138) using the WGI data set with gold resources. Thus, the results
from two diﬀerent data sets using diﬀerent econometric strategies provide ev-
idence supporting my hypothesis and suggesting that my results are robust
across data sets and estimation strategies.
2.4 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is the comprehensive analysis of the eﬀects of two
indicators of the level of resource-abundance on the rule of law and its interaction
with income inequality. The methodologies adopted are suitable for the inclusion of
other resource indicators and institution variables.
My main findings are as follows. First, I indeed find that more resources corre-
spond to better rule of law in a more equitable country. When social polarization
becomes severe, the positive eﬀects of resource-abundance level on the rule of law
turn negative. Although the magnitudes may vary depending upon the choice of in-
dicators, observed diminishing “blessing eﬀects” of resources are robust across data
sets and econometric methodologies.
Possible extensions of the current analysis include consideration of other dimen-
sions of the rule of law such as political stability and crime rates. Another possible
extension would be the compilation of a more comprehensive data set for resources,
so that I can observe whether or not that diminishing bless eﬀects persist across
additional types of resources.
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Table 2.1: Correlation Between Rule of Law from WGI and ICRG
Correlation Year
0.7779 Whole Data set
0.8246 1996
0.8031 1998
0.7627 2000
0.7503 2002
0.7532 2003
0.7724 2004
0.7880 2005
0.7849 2006
0.7957 2007
0.8113 2008
0.8061 2009
0.8003 2010
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Table 2.2: Existing Individual Eﬀects in WGI Data Set
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil Gas Gold Arable Land
Gini 0.00975 0.0100∗ 0.00192 -0.00532
(0.1212) (0.0490) (0.7762) (0.4070)
lnperoil 0.0706
(0.1276)
lnperoil*Gini -0.00202∗
(0.0965)
lnpergas 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0021)
lnpergas*Gini -0.00344∗∗∗
(0.0012)
lnpergold 0.0796∗
(0.0681)
lnpergold*Gini -0.00165
(0.1083)
lnperarable 0.0439
(0.7770)
lnperarable*Gini -0.00191
(0.6014)
Constant -0.288 -0.272 -0.0635 0.172
(0.2188) (0.1571) (0.8157) (0.5303)
Observations 326 324 154 602
Adjusted R2 -0.332 -0.267 -0.458 -0.353
F test for all ui = 0 F (81, 241) = 124.28 F (76, 244) = 134.85 F (50, 100) = 121.51 F (155, 443) = 124.14
Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Existing Individual Eﬀects in ICRG Data Set
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil Gas Gold Arable Land
Gini 0.0497∗∗∗ 0.0280∗ 0.0209 -0.00619
(0.0052) (0.0630) (0.2626) (0.7084)
lnperoil -0.264∗
(0.0725)
lnperoil*Gini -0.000268
(0.9414)
lnpergas -0.201
(0.1412)
lnpergas*Gini 0.00511
(0.1432)
lnpergold 0.0342
(0.8159)
lnpergold*Gini -0.00151
(0.6539)
lnperarable -0.0776
(0.8464)
lnperarable*Gini -0.00863
(0.3382)
Constant 2.928∗∗∗ 3.080∗∗∗ 2.874∗∗∗ 3.351∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Observations 507 498 296 840
Adjusted R2 -0.082 -0.151 -0.209 -0.161
F test for all ui = 0 F (76, 427) = 12.22 F (70, 424) = 11.70 F (51, 241) = 9.67 F (124, 712) = 13.56
Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000 Prob > F = 0.000
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Random Eﬀects Model Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Benchmark) (Gov Size) (Democracy) (Both) (All)
RL(WGI) RL(ICRG) RL(WGI) RL(ICRG) RL(WGI) RL(ICRG) RL(WGI) RL(ICRG) RL(WGI) RL(ICRG)
I. Oil as RS
Gini 0.0037 -0.0156 0.0047 -0.0238∗ 0.0010 -0.0238∗ 0.0029 -0.0271∗∗ 0.0026 -0.0172
(0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013)
Resources 0.0687 0.0150 0.1106∗∗ 0.0853 0.0768 0.0419 0.1180 0.1114 0.1118∗∗ 0.1673
(0.046) (0.116) (0.048) (0.113) (0.047) (0.109) (0.047) (0.108) (0.056) (0.116)
Gini*Resources -0.0022∗ -0.0033 -0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0045 -0.0027∗∗ -0.0032 -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0046 -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Gov Size 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0314 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.0228∗ 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015)
Democracy 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0979∗∗∗ 0.0655∗∗∗ 0.0860∗∗∗ 0.0562∗∗∗ 0.0591∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.021)
Education 0.2862 1.0691∗∗
(0.278) (0.479)
Constant -0.1409 4.7452∗∗∗ -0.4732∗ 4.5189 -0.4129∗ 4.3765 -0.8294∗∗∗ 4.1867∗∗∗ -0.06858∗∗∗ 3.4558∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.500) (0.086) 0.559 (0.249) (0.476) (0.270) 0.539 (0.310) (0.582)
N 326 507 319 492 325 507 318 492 293 481
R2 0.1781 0.1334 0.3706 0.2969 0.5889 0.3571 0.6368 0.4170 0.5914 0.4267
II. Gold as RS
Gini 0.0109∗ -0.0499∗∗∗ -0.0081 -0.0598∗∗∗ -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0527∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012)
Resources 0.1122∗∗ 0.1687 0.0576 0.1401 0.1421∗∗∗ 0.2022 0.0786∗ 0.1592 0.0835∗ 0.1302
(0.045) (0.130) (0.044) (1.08) (0.048) (0.125) (0.047) (0.126) (0.048) (0.1249)
Gini*Resources -0.0023∗∗ -0.0042 -0.0015 -0.0038 -0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0056∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0047 -0.0024∗∗ 0.0044
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.199) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Gov Size 0.0437∗∗∗ 0.0332∗ 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.0295∗ 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0244
(0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018)
Democracy 0.0535∗∗∗ 0.1035∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0895∗∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.023) (0.012) (0.023) (0.012) (0.024)
Education 0.785∗ 0.8364
(0.402) (0.613)
Constant 0.2963 5.5842∗∗∗ -0.4457 5.5372∗∗∗ 0.293 4.7573∗∗∗ -0.3385 4.7405∗∗∗ -0.5806 4.0973∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.533) (0.309) (0.589) (0.295) (0.546) (0.311) (0.609) (0.02) (0.671)
N 154 296 152 289 154 296 152 289 146 275
R2 0.3461 0.3924 0.4100 0.4906 0.6585 0.4672 0.6684 0.5300 0.6727 0.5467
standard errors are in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.5: DPD estimator for ICRG data set (Oil)
Benchmark Gov Size Democracy Both Hybrid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L.rl 0.5988∗∗∗ 0.7236∗∗∗ 0.5574∗∗∗ 0.6752∗∗∗ 0.5738∗∗∗ 0.6054∗∗∗ 0.5570∗∗∗ 0.6094∗∗∗ 0.6272∗∗∗ 0.6748∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.053) (0.058) (0.062) (0.051) (0.061)
Gini 0.001528 0.004213 0.009433 0.01465 0.003707 0.005124 0.01094 0.01476 -0.004167 0.003095
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
oil 0.3097∗ 0.3941∗∗ 0.2668∗∗ 0.3835∗∗ 0.3224∗∗ 0.3947∗∗∗ 0.2954∗∗ 0.3931∗∗∗ 0.1962 0.2658∗∗
(0.172) (0.172) (0.115) (0.189) (0.128) (0.145) (0.143) (0.147) (0.135) (0.130)
Gini*oil -0.009530∗∗ -0.01094∗∗ -0.008102∗∗∗ -0.01019∗∗ -0.009190∗∗ -0.01073∗∗∗ -0.008294∗∗ -0.01039∗∗∗ -0.005361 -0.007057∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
government size 0.03616∗ 0.04145∗∗ 0.03395∗ 0.03035 0.02842 0.02325
(0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
democracy 0.03645∗ 0.06322∗∗∗ 0.02314 0.04135∗ 0.02995 0.05229∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
education -0.7482 -0.6156
(0.459) (0.498)
Constant 1.7341∗∗ 1.0220 0.9887 0.1426 1.4154∗∗ 1.0079 0.7542 0.2929 1.3641 0.7684
(0.691) (0.653) (0.957) (0.941) (0.593) (0.723) (0.942) (0.898) (0.867) (0.777)
p-value of Hansen Test 0.219 0.214 0.492 0.534 0.504 0.437 0.795 0.886 0.986 0.994
p-value of 3rd-order Correlation 0.329 0.477 0.508 0.672 0.350 0.471 0.551 0.645 0.639 0.707
Observations 447 429 435 426 447 429 435 426 426 426
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: DPD estimator for ICRG data set (Gold)
Benchmark Gov Size Democracy Both Hybrid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L.rl icrg 0.6984∗∗∗ 0.7280∗∗∗ 0.6016∗∗∗ 0.6442∗∗∗ 0.6946∗∗∗ 0.7666∗∗∗ 0.6623∗∗∗ 0.6728∗∗∗ 0.6854∗∗∗ 0.6822∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.077) (0.076) (0.075) (0.088) (0.077) (0.080) (0.058) (0.060) (0.057)
Gini -0.03626 -0.02734 -0.03831∗∗ -0.02946∗ -0.03363∗ -0.02692 -0.03546∗∗ -0.02737∗∗ -0.03012∗∗ -0.03029∗∗
(0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
gold 0.4968∗∗ 0.3592 0.1599 0.1458 0.4505∗∗ 0.3133 0.2009 0.1627 0.1911 0.1785
(0.192) (0.226) (0.202) (0.150) (0.222) (0.192) (0.201) (0.148) (0.223) (0.128)
Gini*gold -0.01116∗∗ -0.007763 -0.003922 -0.003769 -0.01025∗∗ -0.006762 -0.004646 -0.003609 -0.004038 -0.003827
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
government size 0.05897∗∗ 0.07673∗∗∗ 0.05215∗ 0.08123∗∗∗ 0.05452∗ 0.06147∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026)
democracy -0.008102 -0.02623 -0.02532 -0.02875 -0.01302 -0.02019
(0.030) (0.027) (0.032) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030)
Education 0.2727 0.1068
(0.469) (0.515)
Constant 2.6537∗∗ 2.1980∗∗ 2.2064∗∗ 1.4436∗ 2.6177∗∗∗ 2.2149∗∗ 2.1390∗∗ 1.3792∗∗ 1.6305∗∗ 1.6654∗∗
(1.184) (0.897) (0.991) (0.734) (0.901) (1.013) (0.824) (0.677) (0.630) (0.726)
p-value of Hansen Test 0.874 0.927 0.988 0.993 0.962 0.990 0.998 1.000 0.916 1.000
p-value of 3rd-order Correlation 0.752 0.736 0.819 0.855 0.720 0.727 0.885 0.929 1.000 0.918
Observations 256 241 251 239 256 241 251 239 239 239
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 2.1: Gini(Disposable Income) Heterogeneity across Countries
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Figure 2.2: Similarity Between Rule of Law from WGI and ICRG
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Figure 2.3: The Heterogeneity of Rule of Law Across All Countries (WGI)
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Figure 2.4: The Heterogeneity of Rule of Law Across All Countries (ICRG)
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Figure 2.5: The Heterogeneity of the Rule of Law Across Periods (WGI)
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Figure 2.6: The Heterogeneity of the Rule of Law Across Periods (ICRG)
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CHAPTER 3
NOTES ON GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH, AND RELATIVE
CONSUMPTION
3.1 Introduction
Recently there has been a revival of interest in the “keeping up with the Joneses”
phenomenon in the economics literature. This is mostly because a number of studies
have found strong evidence in support of the phenomenon. As a result, there has
also been a number of theoretical papers exploring its implications for various areas
in economics. In what follows I construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of
international keeping up with the Joneses to investigate the growth implications of
such behavior by economic agents.
The observation that economic agents care about their consumption or income
levels not only in an absolute sense, but relative to a community of their peers goes
back to at least Adam Smith who defined “necessaries” as “not only the commodities
which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom
of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order,
to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary
of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they
had no linen. But in the present times, . . . a creditable day-labourer would
be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt.” Veblen commented on
the phenomenon in 1899 suggesting that “the accepted standard of expenditure
in the community or in the class to which a person belongs largely determines
what his standard of living will be. It does this directly by commending itself to
his common sense as right and good, through his habitually contemplating it and
assimilating the scheme of life in which it belongs; but it does so also indirectly
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through popular insistence on conformity to the accepted scale of expenditure as a
matter of propriety, under pain of disesteem and ostracism.” Duesenberry’s relative
income hypothesis, emphasizing that households derive utility from income relative
to their peers, has recently been revived by the “happiness” literature reviewed by
Clark et al. (2008) who emphasize the connection between Duesenberry’s work and
the new empirical happiness literature that tries to explain the Easterlin paradox,
the observation that economic growth that raises incomes overall does not lead to
higher levels of “happiness” over time in surveys and other puzzles.1 There is,
however, also a large and growing empirical literature that relies on cross-section
data suggesting that income does raise happiness. A key challenge for the happiness
literature has, therefore, been to render consistent the findings from cross-section
data (suggesting a positive income and happiness correlation) with those from time-
series data (suggesting no correlation between income and happines). The current
consensus in the literature focuses on relative income and consumption as the answer
to the puzzle, suggesting that individuals derive utility not only from absolute levels
of consumption but also from consumption relative to others. That this may indeed
be the case finds strong empirical support from cross-sectional studies (such as that
of Di Tella et al. (2003), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), and Ferrer-i-Carbonell
(2005)) as well as experimental work (see, for instance, Solnick and Hemenway
(1998), Johansson-Stenmann (2002), and Alpizar et al. (2005)).
There is now also a growing theoretical literature on the implications of in-
corporating relative (consumtion or income) status concerns for long-run economic
growth. Cole et al. (1992) look at a matching model and endogenize concern for
relative status in a model of long-run growth. Carroll et al. (1997) introduce con-
1For the “happiness” literature, see, among others, Easterlin (1974, 1995), Kahnemann
and Krueger (2006), and Layard (2005).
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cern for one’s consumption relative to one’s own past consumption and relative
to others’ current consumption into an endogenous AK-type growth model.2 The
model I present below deviates from the models mentioned so far in three impor-
tant respects. First here, unlike the previous theoretical papers that confine to their
attention to closed economies, I explore the implications of concern for relative sta-
tus in an open economy setting that involves two large open economies. Second,
given this setting, a meaningful steady-state equilibrium fails to exist if I assume,
like the rest of the literature, constant rates of time preference. This is because, as
is well-known, if the constant rates of time preference are assumed to be diﬀerent,
the economy that has the higher rate asymptotically becomes negligibly small. If
they are assumed to be equal the two economies end up being clones of each other
with no economically meaningful diﬀerence between them. To avoid these outcomes,
in sharp contrast to existing literature, I endogenize the rates of time preference.
Third, I focus on a case of comparison utility so far ignored in the literature: my
model diﬀerent types of agents comparing their consumption levels to that of dif-
ferent reference groups. Specifically, I postulate that relatively “rich” agents derive
utility from their consumption relative to the consumption of other “rich” agents
agents in the world, while “poor” agents compare their consumption to the average
domestic consumption. This focus is motivated by the observation that the elite in
any given country tend to be more cosmopolitan in their outlook having the means
to travel, communicate, and interact with their peers globally, whereas the “poor”
agents lacking the means to do so tend to be culturally less international.
2Other noteworthy recent growth models that introduce relative status include Fisher
and Hof (2000), Cooper, Garca-Pealosa and Funk (2001), and Liu and Turnovsky (2005).
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3.2 Autarkic Equilibrium
Consider an autarkic economy in which two types of households produce a single,
homogeneous output, using a uniform technology and stocks of reproducible inputs,
Qi(t) = ρKi(t), i = 1, 2 (3.1)
where Qi denotes flows of output, Ki are stocks of inputs accumulated from past
output, and ρ a fixed output-input coeﬃcient that also denotes the rate of reurn
to the inputs. I start here with the autarkic equilibrium in a bare-bones model
that does not have adjustment costs in investment. In the open economy version to
follow this implies that physical capital can instantaneously and freely move across
countries.
The domestic consumption status or relative consumption c of the representative
domestic household is defined by
c(t) ≡ C(t)
Ca(t)
, (3.2)
where C(t) is his consumption level at t, given that he perceives average consumption
to be Ca. For the autarkic economy I will suppose that Ca = (1−n)C1+nC2. Here,
a fraction, 1−n, of the households are type-1 and they diﬀer from type-2 households
in that the latter attach greater weight to utility from relative consumption.
The agents under consideration maximize lifetime utility, which is the discounted
sum of instantaneous felicities. An increase in felicity has two possible sources: It
may be due to a rise in consumption status c at a given level of consumption C, or
it may result from growth in C at given c. Thus,
V˜ [Γ(0)] ≡
∫ ∞
0
v[C(t), c(t)] exp
{
−
∫ ∞
0
θ˜ [C(s), c(s);ω] ds
}
dt, vi > 0 (i = 1, 2)
(3.3)
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where Γ(0) ≡ {C(t), c(t)}∞t=0 denotes the expected path of C and c starting at t = 0;
v[·] felicity from C(t) and c(t); and θ˜[·] a variable discount rate that depends on the
shift parameter ω, which measures the degree of the household impatience. It is
convenient to follow Epstein and Hynes (1983) and specialize (3.3) to
V [Γ(0)] ≡
∫ ∞
0
− exp
{
−
∫ ∞
0
θ˜ [C(s), c(s);ω] ds
}
dt (3.4)
by setting v(C, c) = −1.3 I further specialize (3.3) by assuming that the discount
rate θ˜[·] is (i) separable in utility from C and c; (ii) increasing in both of these
arguments:4
θ˜[C(s), c(s);ω] ≡ ω + ϕ[c(s)] + u[C(s)], u′,ϕ′ > 0, u′′,ϕ′′ < 0, (3.5)
θ˜i > 0 (i = 1− 3)
Finally, following a suggestion of Obstfeld (1990), I assume that u[C(t)] has an
upper bound δ: as C(t)→∞, u[C(t)]→ δ <∞. Consequently, though in a setting
of endogenous growth the level of consumption C will increase without bound, the
discount rate need not become unbounded, if relative consumption c stabilizes. Since
u[C(t)] equals the constant δ in the neighborhood of a corresponding steady state,
the intertemporal decision problem can now be viewed as locally reducing to the
maximization of
J [Γ(0)] ≡
∫ ∞
0
− exp
{
−
∫ ∞
0
θ˜ [c(s);ω] ds
}
dt, θ˜i > 0 (i = 1− 3), θ˜i1 < 0, (3.6)
3(3.4) preserves the essential properties of (3.3) and yields a particularly simple form
of momentary time preference, dependent on Γ(t) alone and not on C(t) and c(t).
4Which should be compared to the standard assumption [Uzawa (1968)] that θ˜[·] is
increasing in C alone.
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from (3.4) and (3.5). It is convenient to suppose that both u and ϕ in (3.5) take
logarithmic forms, so that the discount rate in (3.6) becomes
θi = ωi + (1− βi) lnCi + βi ln ci = ωi + (1− βi)δ + βi ln ci i = 1, 2 (3.7)
where βi is the weight attached by domestic households to utility from relative
consumption. As type-2 households attach greater weight to utility from relative
consumption β1 < β2. Note that ω represents a status-impatience parameter.
When the mass of households is normalized to one, one can use Ca = (1−n)C1+
nC2 to obtain relative consumptions ci = C/Ca
1 = (1− n)c1 + nc2. (3.8)
The optimization problem of a representative domestic household may now be
summarized. His task is to find a path Γ(0) that maximizes
J [Γ(0)] ≡
∫ ∞
0
− exp [−z(t)] exp
[
−
∫ t
0
ρ(s)ds
]
dt (3.9)
subject to
z˙(t) = θ[c(t)]− ρ(t) (3.10)
k˙(t) = [ρ(t)− ga(t)] k(t)− c(t), k(0) > 0, (3.11)
k(t) ≡ K(t)/Ca(t), ga(t) ≡ C˙a(t)/Ca(t),
where {ga(t)}∞t=0 and {ρ(t)}∞t=0 denote the path of the growth rate ga of average world
consumption and the path of the numeraire interest rate ρ expected by domestic
agents.
The first-order necessary conditions (where λ ≡ λ˜ exp(z), φ ≡ φ˜ exp(z))
−φ
c
= ς (3.12)
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ς˙ = ς [θ(c)− (ρ− ga)] (3.13)
φ˙ = φθ(c) + 1. (3.14)
This setup gives rise to the momentary rate of time preference
Ω(φ) = θ(c)
{
1− φ+ [θ(c)]
−1
φ
}
= −φ−1 (3.15)
where φ, the solution of (3.14) for convergent φ, equals the utility value J [Γ(t)] of a
stream of future consumption Γ(t) starting at t.
By combining (3.15) with (3.12)-(3.14), one finds the law of optimal relative
consumption for a given representative domestic household to be
c˙ = c [ρ− ga − Ω(φ)] . (3.16)
Using the definition of Ca and ga I obtain
(1− n)c1g1 + nc2g2 = ga (3.17)
The gi are determined by
gi = ρ− Ω(φi), (3.18)
from (3.16) and the definition of ci.
Using (3.17) and (3.18) in (3.16) one finds
c˙1 = c1c2n [Ω2(φ2)− Ω1(φ1)] (3.19)
c˙2 = c2c1(1− n) [Ω1(φ1)− Ω2(φ2)] (3.20)
which represent the law of motion of the distribution of consumption. From (3.14)
I obtain
φ˙i = φiθi(ci) + 1 ≡ ζ(φ, c), ζ1 > 0, ζ2 < 0 (3.21)
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which, together with (3.19), form a self-contained system in the three non-predetermined
state variables φi and c1.
Clearance of the output market requires that total output in this economy equal
total consumption and investment
ρKa = Ca + K˙a, Ka = ΣiKi. (3.22)
Using equations (3.17) and (3.22) together with the definition γ ≡ Ca/Ka yields
γ˙ = γ(γ − Ωa), Ωa ≡ (1− n)c1Ω1 + nc2Ω2. (3.23)
Finally, the law of motion for the distribution of wealth, f1 ≡ K1/Ka, is obtained
from equations (3.11) and (3.22) as
f˙1 = γ(f1 − c1). (3.24)
Equations (3.19), (3.21), (3.23), and (3.24) constitute a five-dimensional dif-
ferential equation system with four jumping and one (f) pre-determined variable.
It is straightforward to show that the linearized version of this system possesses
one negative and four positive eigenvalues, guaranteeing local saddlepath stability.
Decentralized optimization ensures that the economy converges to a steady-state,
whose properties are easily derived. First, (3.15) and φ˙i = 0 imply
Ω¯1 = θ¯(c1; β1) = θ¯(c2; β2) = Ω¯2. (3.25)
Thus, assuming ω1 = ω2 = ω I have
Ω¯ = ω + (1− β1)δ + β1 ln c1 = ω + (1− β2)δ + β2 ln c2. (3.26)
It is straightforward to show that β2 > β1 ⇒ c1 < c2 at the steady-state equilibrium.
Since from (3.24) I have f¯1 = c¯1, from the definition of f1, it follows that f¯2 = c¯2.
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Thus, type-2 agents, that are more concerned with relative consumption, will also
own a relatively larger share of the capital stock in the long run.
In what follows I would like to explore the eﬀects of opening up countries with
diﬀerent types of households to intertemporal trade. For this purpose it is important
to determine how diﬀerences in household types give rise to diﬀerences in autarkic
rates of time preference at the steady state. The most parsimonious way of studying
the issue is to suppose that the world consists of two countries each of which is
inhabited by two types of households. The countries are then assumed to diﬀer
only with respect to the degree to which, say, type-1 households value utility from
relative consumption. Suppose now, without loss of generality that β1 < β∗1 (where
asterisks indicate foreign country variables). Again it is straighforward to show that
the country with the higher β1 would, ceteris paribus, have a lower autarkic rate of
time preference, i.e. β1 < β∗1 ⇒ Ω¯ > Ω¯∗
As both countries have access to the same linear AK technology with production
functions given by Q(∗) = ρK(∗)i their autarkic growth rates would then be given by
ρ− Ω¯∗ = g¯∗ < g¯ = ρ− Ω¯.
Thus, the economy in which poor agents care more about relative consumption
will grow slower in the autarkic steady-state equilibrium.
3.3 Global Equilibrium
I will now open these countries up in two senses of the term: (i) liberalize trade,
and (ii) allow international comparisons of relative consumption. Here liberalizing
either intratemporal (goods) or intertemporal (international borrowing or lending)
trade does not generate any trade for the simple reason that (a) there is only one
good and (b) rates of return, ρ, on assets are already equalized. Thus, the only
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eﬀect of globalization (opening up) is to globalize the comparison groups by which
relative levels of consumption are judged. I will consider two cases below depending
on the comparison groups.
3.3.1 Comparison group: Global average
Here each agent in each country derives utility from her consumption relative to the
world average.
Suppose that both countries have their populations normalized to unity. I can
write average world consumption, caver, as
caver = (1/2) [(1− n)C1 + (1− n∗)C∗1 + nC2 + n ∗ C∗2 ] (3.27)
Relative consumptions c(∗)i as perceived by agents would then be given by
c(∗)i ≡
C(∗)i
caver
.
At a steady state where θ¯1 = θ¯2 = θ¯∗1 = θ¯
∗
2, I have c¯i = c¯
∗
i for i = 1, 2. From
(3.27) this implies that [
1− (n+ n
∗)
2
]
c¯1 +
(n+ n∗)
2
c¯2 = 1. (3.28)
Using (3.8), (3.28), n∗ < n, and Figure 2, it is now straightforward to show
that “globalization” equalizes the rates of growth by equalizing the rates of time
preference:
a− Ω¯∗ = g¯∗ < gW = a− Ω¯W < g¯ = a− Ω¯
where the superscript W denotes the values of the variables in the open economy
setup.
Thus, globalization raises the long-run growth rate of the slower-growing foreign
economy and vice versa for the domestic one.
61
3.3.2 Comparison group: Domestic rich vs foreign rich
Here I suppose that globalization implies that the domestic rich (type-2 agents)
compare their consumption to foreign rich (and vice versa) so that the relevant
relative consumption levels are
c2 =
C2
Cw,aver2
=
C2
nC2+n∗C∗2
n+n∗
(3.29)
where Cw,aver2 denotes the world average of type-2 household consumption levels.
The relative wealth levels of type-2 agents need consequently be redefined as
f2 =
K2
Kw,aver2
=
K2
nK2+n∗K∗2
n+n∗
(3.30)
I still have type-1 households comparing their consumption to type-2 households.
Thus
c1 =
C1
Caver
=
C1
(1− n)C1 + nC2 . (3.31)
In the rest of the paper, I am interested in looking at the eﬀects of “globalization”
on welfare and the distribution of wealth and income when the comparison group
of the wealthy everywhere is their foreign counterparts. Since this requires looking
at the full adjustment paths of the relevant variables, I now turn to the solution of
the diﬀerential equation system.
Laws of motion for the subjective relative preferences
At a point in time, as in the autarkic case, the behavior of households in any given
economy are defined by the solution of the lifetime utility maximization problem
(3.9) subject to (3.10) and (3.11) with the diﬀerence that relative consumption levels
here are given by (3.29) and (3.31). The solution of the problem yields in addition
to (3.21) the laws of motion of relative consumptions ci, consumption-wealth ratios
γi, and relative wealth levels fi as
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c˙(∗)it = c
(∗)
i (Ω
a(∗)
i − Ω(∗)i )
Ωa(∗)1 ≡ (1− n)(∗)c(∗)1 Ω(∗)1 + [1− (1− n(∗))c(∗)1 ]Ω(∗)2
Ωa2 ≡
n
n+ n∗
c2Ω2 +
(
1− n
n+ n∗
c2
)
Ω∗2
γ˙it = γi(γi − Ωai ), i = 1, 2
f˙it = γi(fi − ci)
where γi ≡ Cavi /Kavi , fi ≡ Ki/Kavi and Kav1 ≡ (1 − n)K1 + nK2, Kav2 ≡ (nK2 +
n∗K∗2)/(n+ n
∗) and n+ n∗ = nc2 + n∗c∗2.
These equations constitute a thirteen-dimensional diﬀerential equation system
with ten jumping and three (fi) pre-determined variables. It is straightforward to
show that the linearized version of this system possesses three negative and ten
positive eigenvalues, guaranteeing local saddlepath stability.
Steady State
Suppose now that the two countries diﬀer in only one respect: foreign type-1 house-
holds attach greater weight to utility from relative consumption, β1 < β∗1 < β2 = β
∗
2 .
At an autarkic steady state this implies that
c¯aut1 < c¯
∗aut
1 , c¯
aut
2 > c¯
∗aut.
2 ⇒ Ω¯aut > Ω¯∗aut.
At a steady state under globalization, where θ¯2 = θ¯∗2 , I have C2 = C
∗
2 and, thus,
c¯2 = c¯∗2 = 1. Since the last two equalities imply c¯
(∗)
2 < c¯
(∗),aut
2 and c¯
(∗)
1 < c¯
(∗),aut
1 I
have the following5
Ω¯(∗) < Ω¯(∗),aut ⇒ g¯(∗) > g¯(∗),aut.
5Note that I do not need to refer to the type-1 households to derive the results concern-
ing growth. The equality of their rates of time preference to those of type-2 households
at a steady state is used to determine their relative consumption levels.
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That is, across steady states globalization increases the rate of growth of both
countries above their autarkic levels.
To explore the eﬀects of globalization in this world on welfare and the distribution
of wealth I now turn to the diﬀerential equations themselves and their solutions.
Solutions of subjective model diﬀerential equations
Linearizing the model yields the following set of solutions for the diﬀerential equa-
tions.
φ1t−φ¯1 = β1β2(f20 − f¯2)[1− c¯1(1− n)]
Ω¯2 [β1[1− c¯1(1− n)]− β2] [exp(λ2t)− exp(λ1t)]+
β1(f10 − f¯1)
c¯1Ω¯2
exp(λ1t)
φ2t − φ¯2 = β2(f20 − f¯2)
Ω¯2
exp(λ2t)
φ∗1t−φ¯∗1 =
β∗1β2(f20 − f¯2)[1− c¯∗1(1− n∗)]
Ω¯2 [β∗1 [1− c¯∗1(1− n∗)]− β2]
[exp(λ3t)− exp(λ2t)]+β
∗
1(f
∗
10 − f¯ ∗1 )
c¯∗1Ω¯2
exp(λ3t)
φ∗2t − φ¯∗2 = −
β2(f20 − f¯2)
Ω¯2
exp(λ2t)
c1t − c¯1 = c¯1β2(f20 − f¯2)[1− c¯1(1− n)]
Ω¯ [β1[1− c¯1(1− n)]− β2]
[
(Ω¯− λ2) exp(λ2t)− (Ω¯− λ1) exp(λ1t)
]
+
(Ω¯− λ1)(f10 − f¯1)
Ω¯
exp(λ1t)
c2t − c¯2 = (f20 − f¯2)(Ω¯− λ2)
Ω¯
exp(λ2t)
c∗1t − c¯∗1 =
c¯∗1β2(f20 − f¯2)[1− c¯∗1(1− n∗)]
Ω¯ [β∗1 [1− c¯∗1(1− n∗)]− β2]
[
(Ω¯− λ3) exp(λ3t)− (Ω¯− λ2) exp(λ2t)
]
+
(Ω¯− λ3)(f ∗10 − f¯ ∗1 )
Ω¯
exp(λ3t)
c∗2t − c¯∗2 = 1 +
n
n∗
(1− c2t)− c¯∗2
f1t − f¯1 = c¯1β2(f20 − f¯2)[1− c¯1(1− n)]
[β1[1− c¯1(1− n)]− β2] [exp(λ2t)− exp(λ1t)] + (f10 − f¯1) exp(λ1t)
64
f2t − f¯2 = (f20 − f¯2) exp(λ2t)
f ∗1t − f¯ ∗1 =
c¯∗1β2(f20 − f¯2)[1− c¯∗1(1− n∗)]
[β∗1 [1− c¯∗1(1− n∗)]− β2]
[exp(λ3t)− exp(λ2t)] + (f ∗10 − f¯ ∗1 ) exp(λ3t)
f ∗2t − f¯ ∗2 = 1 +
n
n∗
(1− f2t)− f¯ ∗2
γ1t−γ¯1 = −β2Ω¯(f20 − f¯2)[1− c¯1(1− n)]
[β1[1− c¯1(1− n)]− β2]
[
(β2 − β1)
(Ω¯− λ2) exp(λ2t) +
β1(1− n)c¯1
(Ω¯− λ2) exp(λ1t)
]
+ (f10 − f¯1)Ω¯β1(1− n)
(Ω¯− λ1) exp(λ1t)
γ2t − γ¯2 = 0
γ∗1t−γ¯∗1 =
β2Ω¯(f20 − f¯2)[1− c¯∗1(1− n∗)]
[β∗1 [1− c¯∗1(1− n∗)]− β2]
[
(β2 − β∗1)
(Ω¯− λ2) exp(λ2t) +
β∗1(1− n∗)c¯∗1
(Ω¯− λ3) exp(λ3t)
]
+ (f ∗10 − f¯ ∗1 )
Ω¯β1(1− n∗)
(Ω¯− λ3) exp(λ3t)
γ∗2t = γ2t
Here an important point to note is that the definition of both relative consump-
tion, c, and relative wealth, f, changes for type-2 agents as the autarkic economies
are opened up. This change in the perspective of type-2 agents requires that at
t = 0, I write
f20 =
K20
Kw,aver20
=
K20
nK20+n∗K∗20
n+n∗
=
µ0
nµo+n∗
n+n∗
(3.32)
where µ0 ≡ K20/K∗20 denotes the wealth of domestic type-2 agents relative to their
foreign counterparts at t = 0. The value of µ0 is historically determined by the initial
values of the wealth of these agents and their growth rates during autarky. In my
simulations below I report the results using two possible values of µ0 corresponding
to the cases of domestic agents being relatively more and less wealth compared to
their foreign counterparts.
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The negative eigenvalues are given by
λ1 =
1
2
(
Ω−√Ω
√
Ω+ 4β1 [1− c1(1− n)]
)
λ2 =
1
2
(
Ω−√Ω
√
Ω+ 4β2
)
λ3 =
1
2
(
Ω−√Ω
√
Ω+ 4β∗1 [1− c∗1(1− n∗)]
)
.
A number of results immediately follow from the analytical solutions before I turn to
the calibration and simulation of the model. First, note that whether an agent suﬀers
a welfare loss or benefits from a welfare gain upon globalization can be determined
in a straightforward way by the sign of φ+i0− φ¯i0. This is because φi0 is by definition
simply the present discounted value of lifetime utility at t = 0. Thus, suppose that
globalization is unexpectedly introduced at t = 0. The forward-looking jumping
variable φ will instantaneously and discretely change upon impact (attaining the
value φ¯+i0), with the change in its t = 0 value measuring the impact of globalization
on the welfare of the agent in question. Thus, for instance, globalization would
change the welfare of a type-1 domestic agent by φ+10− φ¯−10 = β1(f10−f1)c1Ω2 + (φ¯1− φ¯10).
As −1/φ¯−10 = Ω¯aut > Ω¯ = −1/φ¯1, the second term on the right, (φ¯1 − φ¯10) < 0, that
is the welfare of type-1 domestic agents is lower in the long-run under globalization.
To determine whether the agent would gain from globalization, however, requires
the calculation of the discounted utility from the entire transition path between the
two long-run equilibria and not just a comparison of the latter two. This is achieved
by determining the sign of φ+10 − φ¯−10 , which includes the additional term β1(f10−f1)c1Ω2 .
Thus, for this agent to gain from globalization this last term needs to be positive and
large enough. Intuitively speaking, this, in turn requires f10 > f1, i.e. globalization
should trigger a suﬃciently large reduction in the type-1 agent’s share of wealth.
In other words, globalization should induce a decrease in savings and an increase
in consumption to yield welfare gains. To determine such changes I calibrate and
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simulate the model and obtain the impulse-response functions displayed in Figure
3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
My main results can now be noted as follows. Along the transition path, domes-
tic type-1 households reduce their relative holdings of wealth, which allows them
to increase their relative consumption initially. However, the temporary increase in
consumption is not suﬃecient to compensate for the long-run loss in their welfare
and, as a result, domestic type-1 households suﬀer a loss of welfare under global-
ization. Their foreign type-1 counterparts, however, do not have to reduce their
consumption in the later stages of their adjustment to the extent domestic agents
need to do, and as a result, gain from globalization. Type-2 domestic households
gain from globalization if their initial wealth levels relative to their foreign coun-
terparts are higher; they lose otherwise. Intuitively, if these households have lower
initial wealth relative to their foreign counterparts, they have to save more and
consume less “to keep up with the Joneses,” which reduces their welfare. To the
extent that they are ahead of their foreign counterparts they enjoy their relative
consumption status and they gain from globalization. Similar reasoning explains
the changes in the welfare of foreign type-2 households reported in the figure.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, my focus is the welfare and distributional consequences of the house-
hold concern for international relative status or “keeping up with the Joneses.” The
empirical literature so far has presented evidence the importance of relative income
and consumption status for the saving and consumption behavior of households both
for the domestic and international cases. the theoretical literature has analyzed the
case for domestic relative consumption status exclusively. My innovation here is
twofold. First, I analyze concern for relative status for the cases where the reference
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group is either domestic or international. Second, I use an endogenous growth model
with endogenous rates of time preference, which allows me to analyze the growth
implications of concern for status in a setting in which I do not have to arbitrarily
assume identical rates of time preference to ensure the existence of a steady state
equilibrium.
My results suggest that not every household benefits from “globalization” defined
to be a move to a state where relative status concerns are globalized. Those agents
who need to increase their savings to raise their relative status may experience
welfare losses. I do show, however, that across steady states globalization increases
the rate of growth of both countries above their autarkic levels.
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Figure 3.2: Simulated Results φ Time Path
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Figure 3.3: Simulated Results of Time paths of f and γ
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